We generalize traditional equilibrium concepts for finite games in extensive form with behavioral strategies so that they apply to all games, including games of imperfect recall. Adapting and augmenting previous definitions (in particular, by Piccione and Rubinstein, and by Battigalli), we define four notions: Distributed Agent Equilibrium (DAE), Distributed Nash Equilibrium (DNE), Distributed Sequential Equilibrium (DSE), and Distributed Perfect Equilibrium (DPE). We show that, in a precise sense, these extend the classical equilibrium notions: (a) they form a strict inclusion hierarchy (e.g., every DNE is a DAE but not necessarily vice versa, and so on up the hierarchy), (b) every game has a DPE (and therefore also a DSE, DNE and DAE), and (c) in the subclass of games of perfect recall, DAE, DNE, DSE and DPE collapse, respectively, to agent equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and perfect equilibrium. In service of these results we introduce several novel notions -including partial symmetry, the distributed agent form and phantom strategies -which may be interesting in their own right.
 1 
Introduction
Games of imperfect recall are those in which players may not remember their entire experience during the game (specifically, when in some information set, a player may not know the information sets she visited previously, nor the actions she took). Although historically under-researched in game theory, imperfect recall is a key notion if one hopes to apply game theoretic models in practice. In the real world, humans and computer agents alike do not have unlimited memory, and requiring players to remember the entire history of play is often unrealistic. Even when realistic, it can be counterproductive. A good example of this can be seen in computer poker. The state of the art in computer poker for the past few years has been for players to abstract the full extensive form game of poker (by losing the distinction among certain cards) and then play an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this abstract game. Recently, it has been shown that allowing imperfect recall strategies improves the quality of the resulting strategy [7] . There is every reason to think that this lesson applies broadly in many application domains.
Games of imperfect recall present several novel fundamental challenges. In this paper we address the modeling challenges, specifically solution concepts that are appropriate for all extensive-form games, including those of imperfect recall. In a companion paper we address computational challenges.
In order to understand imperfect recall, it is a good idea to understand the state of the art of perfect recall. A good starting point for this discussion is provided by games in extensive forms with perfect information. For this class of games the two most common solution concepts are the Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE)
2 [12] , and its refinement subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) [10] . When one moves to games of imperfect information, the notion of SPE must be replaced by the more involved notions of sequential equilibrium (SE) [9] and perfect equilibrium (PE) [14] . But so long as one restricts the discussion to games with mixed strategies rather than the more natural behavioral strategies, the intuitions carry over from the perfect-information case, as do the formal properties: The solution concepts form a strict hierarchy (every SE is a NE but not vice versa; and every PE is a SE but not vice versa), and every game has a PE (and thus also a SE and NE).
All this is still true with behavioral strategies in the subclass of games of perfect recall, that is, games in which agents in fact do remember their history in the game. It is well known that in such games behavioral strategies can be emulated by mixed strategies, and vice versa [10] , and thus in general these games do not present new issues. But all this changes in games of imperfect recall. In this broader class neither the standard intuitions nor the standard technical results hold, and the elegant map of solution concepts breaks down. The goal of this paper is to extend the elegance to games with imperfect recall.
To gain appreciation for the challenges associated with imperfect recall, we first note that the basic properties of the standard solution concepts cease to hold in this class. For one thing, games with imperfect recall may not have a NE, as seen in the game depicted in Figure 1 . It is not hard to see that this game has no NE. This has been known for a while; it was shown formally by Wichardt [16] , but observed informally earlier (cf. [2] , example 2.4).
Other standard properties also break down in games of imperfect recall; for example, it is shown by Kline that there exist SE that are not NE and PE that are not SE [8] . However, it is not only the formal properties that start to break down, but also the intuition about the very concepts involved. This was most strikingly demonstrated in Piccione and Rubinstein's 1997 paper on imperfect recall in extensive decision problems (that is, extensive-form games with a single player) [13] . That paper provides a paradoxical example demonstrating that naive reasoning about beliefs and behavioral strategies can lead to inconsistent conclusions.
The literature following the Piccione and Rubinstein paper (e.g., [1, 3, 5, 4 offered a variety of formal constructs that shed light on the situation, but did not culminate in a map of solution concepts that naturally extends the elegant map from the perfect-recall case. We will provide exactly this extension, which is summarized in Figure 2 . In this symmetric picture, we add to the perfect-recall class the solution concept of agent equilibrium (AE). Introduced by Kuhn [10] , in games of perfect information AE considers each player as being composed of multiple agents (or "selves"), all sharing the same payoff function, and each controlling a single information set. The four solution concepts form a strict inclusion hierarchy (that is, every PE is a SE but not vice versa, and so on up the hierarchy ( Figure 6 shows examples that demonstrate the strictness of the inclusion)). All four notions are generalized to the class of games with imperfect recall, in the form of Distributed Agent Equilibrium (DAE), Distributed Nash Equilibrium (DNE), Distributed Sequential Equilibrium (DSE), and Distributed Perfect Equilibrium (DPE). The generalized versions form their own hierarchy (that is, every DAE is a DNE, etc.), and collapse to the standard notions in games with perfect recall. Note that from (a) the inclusion among the generalized notions, (b) the collapse to classical notions in case of perfect recall, and (c) the strictness of inclusion in the case of perfect recall, follows the strictness of inclusion of these generalized solution concepts as well. Most importantly, we will prove the existence of this hierarchy; we will show that every game has a DPE (and therefore also a DSE, DNE and DAE).
Two remarks are in order. First, although as we said previously, research has not resulted in a clean picture such as the one we present here, it definitely produced many of the ingredients needed to construct this picture. We will discuss that literature in more detail in Section 6, but let us highlight two papers in particular. Piccione and Rubinstein themselves discuss approaches to resolving the apparent paradox, one of which they call modified multiselves consistent strategy (or MMCS), so called since it is a modification of Strotz's original multiselves approach [15] . Our notion of DAE is essentially the multi-player generalization of MMCS. Battigalli, among other things, defines the Modified Multiselves Sequential Equilibrium (MMSE). Our notion of DSE is essentially MMSE, again generalized to the multi-player case. So the solution concepts we lay out have their origins in these two earlier papers (as well as some others we will discuss in Section 6), although some nuanced changes and additional constructs are needed in order to have the clean inclusion relations among them, and the collapse to the traditional notions in the special case of perfect recall. The hardest technical contribution in this paper consists of existence proofs, specifically existence of DPE. This part has no precedent in the papers mentioned; they are concerned almost exclusively with the single agent case, in which existence is trivial (any optimal strategy is outcome equivalent to a DPE). Our proof appeals to a novel game form we call the distributed agent form, which may have interest in its own right. The distributed agent form can be viewed as further breaking up the strategic entities; if the agent form assigns a strategic decision maker to each information set, the distributed agent form assigns a strategic decision makers to certain subsets of nodes within each information set.
The second comment is that Figure 2 tells only part of the story. Additional solution concepts can be defined, and relationships among them proved. Section 6 presents some of this expanded map. However, in our view, while the expanded map is useful to explain precisely the connections to previous work, Figure 2 captures the most salient concepts and relationships.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will go over background definitions and notation, and then define the notions of DAE, DNE, DSE, and DPE. Section 3 will establish the inclusion hierarchy among these four equilibrium notions. Section 4 will prove the existence of a DPE (and thus also DAE, DNE, and DSE). Section 5 will prove the collapse to standard equilibrium notions in the case of perfect recall. Section 6 will expand the map of Figure 2 , and use the expanded map to position relevant prior work. Finally, Section 7 will discuss the implications of our results and some open questions.
Background and Definitions

Standard Definitions and Notation
In this section we cover the necessary material to understand AE, NE, SE, and PE and define these four equilibrium concepts.
Definition 1 (Extensive Form
). An extensive form game is a six-tuple Γ = N, H, P, ρ, u, I , where
• N is a finite set of players.
• H is a finite set of sequences that represent the possible histories of actions.
H must contain the empty sequence and if (a 1 , . . . , a K ) ∈ H and
The set of terminal histories of H is denoted Z. The set of actions available at a particular history h is defined as A(h) = {a : (h, a) ∈ H}.
• P : H/Z → N ∪ {c} (where H/Z is the set of all non-terminal histories) is the player function that assigns a player or Nature to each non-terminal history. We will denote C to be the set of non-terminal histories assigned to Nature and D to be the set of non-terminal histories assigned to players.
• ρ is a prior on Nature's actions (i.e. for all h ∈ C, ρ(h) ∈ ∆(A(h))).
• u i : Z → R is the utility function for player i.
• I is the set of information sets. I is a partition of D such that if X ∈ I then for all h, h ∈ X, A(h) = A(h ) and P (h) = P (h ). Because of this requirement we will overload the action and player functions; for an information set X we define A(X) = A(h), P (X) = P (h) where h ∈ X. For a player i, I i = {X : P (X) = i} denotes the set of information sets assigned to player i.
The experience of player i at history h, denoted exp i (h), is the sequence of information sets and actions of player i along the history h. An extensive form game has perfect recall if for every information set X and for every h, h ∈ X it is the case that exp i (h) = exp i (h ), where i is the player assigned to X. A game of imperfect recall is one without perfect recall. Given a history h = (a 1 , . . . , a K ) and L ≤ K the history h = (a 1 , . . . , a L ) is said to precede h, which is denoted h ≤ h. Furthermore, a history h strictly precedes history h, written h < h, if h ≤ h and h = h. A game exhibits absentmindedness if there is an information set X and h, h ∈ X such that h < h; thus, absentmindedness is a special case of imperfect recall.
A behavioral strategy 3 for player i, b i , is a distribution for each information set assigned to i over the actions available at that information set (i.e. b i ∈ X∈Ii ∆(A(X)) ). The set of strategies for player i will be denoted Σ i . A strategy profile b = i∈N b i is a set of strategies, one for each player. Likewise the set of strategy profiles for a game will be denoted Σ. Given a strategy profile b and an information set X we let b(X) denote the distribution over A(X) defined by b (that is, b(X) = b i (X) where b i ∈ B and i is the player assigned to X). Thus given a particular action a ∈ A(X), b(X)(a) gives the probability of playing a upon reaching information set X. We will often break up a strategy profile into two parts; b = (b i , b −i ) where b i is strategy for player i and b −i is the set of strategies for all other players.
A strategy profile b induces a probability distribution over terminal histories,
Note that the resulting function is not a distribution over H (i.e. p b / ∈ ∆(H)). We use this distribution to extend the utility function for player i to a strategy profile b linearly as follows
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium [12] ). A strategy profile b is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if for every player i and every strategy b i .
The following definition has its roots in much prior work, in particular [10] .
Definition 3 (Agent Form). The agent form of a game Γ = N, H, P, ρ, u, I is a derivative game Γ where:
• N = I.
• H = H.
• P (h) = c : If h ∈ C X : If h ∈ X for X ∈ I
• ρ = ρ.
• For X ∈ I, u X = u P (X) .
• I = I. 3 We will refer to behavioral strategies simply as strategies for the remainder of the paper.
In other words, the agent form gives control of every information set to an independent agent who receives the same payoff as the player that originally controlled that information set. Notice that because the set of histories and the set of information sets remains unchanged there is a clear bijective correspondence between strategy profiles of the agent game and strategy profiles of the original game. This fact allows us to define the agent equilibrium (AE) of a game.
Definition 4 (Agent Equilibrium
). An agent equilibrium of a game Γ is a strategy profile that corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the agent form of Γ.
Before we define sequential equilibrium, we need to define the notion of beliefs [13] . For each information set X, a belief µ(X) is an distribution over the histories in X. A belief µ is said to be consistent with a strategy profile b if for every information set X with positive probability of being reached and every h ∈ X we have
h ∈X p b (h ) We can also consider the distribution over terminal histories induced by strategy profile b when we assume play starts at a particular history h: p b (·|h) ∈ ∆(Z). We can similarly define utility for player i conditioned on history h as
Combining beliefs and conditional utility, we can develop a subjective version of utility. That is to say for a strategy profile b, a player i, and an information set X the subjective utility is given by
Armed with this machinery we can define sequential equilibrium (SE).
Definition 5 (Sequential Equilibrium [9] 4 ). A strategy profile b is a sequential equilibrium if there exists a sequence of completely mixed strategy profiles b 1 , b 2 , ... that converge to b and a sequence of positive real numbers 1 , 2 , ... that converge to 0 such that for every k, for every belief µ consistent with b k , for every information set X (assigned to player i), and for every strategy b i
The last standard definition we will present is perfect equilibrium. In order to define this concept we must give a definition of a perturbed game [14] . Given a game Γ, a perturbation η of Γ is a function that associates with every information set X and action a ∈ A(X) a positive probability η(X)(a) > 0 such that for every information set X, a∈A(X) η(X)(a) < 1. A perturbed game is then a pair (Γ, η) consisting of of a game Γ a perturbation η. In a perturbed game players are not allowed play strategies that assign less than η probability to each of their actions. That is to say for every player i strategy b i of the perturbed game (Γ, η), it must be that for each information set X assigned to player i and for each action a ∈ A(X), we have b i (X)(a) ≥ η(X)(a). In order to distinguish these more restricted strategies from strategies of Γ, we call the strategies allowed in (Γ, η) perturbed strategies. We can analogously define perturbed strategy profiles in the obvious way.
Definition 6 (Perfect Equilibrium [14] ). Given a game Γ, a strategy profile b is a perfect equilibrium if there exists a sequence of perturbed games (Γ, η 1 ), (Γ, η 2 ), . . . where η k → 0 and a sequence of correspondingly perturbed strategy profiles
Finally, having presented the definitions of these four concepts, we note that it is also well known that they form an inclusion hierarchy [10, 9] . Furthermore, as demonstrated in Figure 6 , this hierarchy is strict.
Main Definitions
We now move on from these well known definitions to our new definitions that are the focus of this paper: DAE, DNE, DSE, and DPE.
All of these notions rely on the hypothetical construct we will call phantom strategies. Whereas a standard strategy specifies a distribution for every information set (i.e., a strategy b i is in X∈Ii ∆(A(X))), a phantom strategy β i specifies for each node h assigned to player i a distribution over the actions available at h. A phantom strategy profile β = i∈N β i is a set of phantom strategies, one for each player. Like a normal strategy profile, a phantom strategy profile induces a distribution of terminal nodes (both ex-ante and from a particular history h). Thus we can further extend the notions of utility to apply to phantom strategy profiles in the obvious way.
Phantom strategies allow us represent the ex-interim reasoning of the agent. Of particular interest to us will be a subclass of phantom strategy profiles called single-deviation phantom strategy. Specifically, given a player i, a (standard) strategy b i , a history h assigned to player i, and a deviation distribution s ∈ ∆(A(h)), we denoted the single-deviation phantom strategy profile b i [h/s] and formally define it given a player i history h (in information set X) by
Intuitively, in a single-deviation phantom strategy the agent is saying "just this once I will deviate from the strategy prescribed for this information set."
Of course the agent does not know at which node in the information set she is, hence the name "phantom", but she may have a belief regarding the nodes, in which case she can reason about the effect of this "just this one time" deviation on an expected basis.
The role of phantom strategies becomes apparent when we define a new form of subjective utility, called distributed subjective utility. Given a strategy profile b, a player i, an information set X, a distribution s ∈ A(X), and belief µ, we define distributed subjective utility to be
In words, distributed subjected utility first calculates for each node in information set X the expected payoff given strategy profile b and assuming that the deviation occurs only at that node, and then takes the expectation over the nodes given the belief µ. Note that
We can now move on the definitions of our equilibrium concepts.
Definition 7 (Distributed Agent Equilibrium (DAE)).
A strategy profile b is a Distributed Agent Equilibrium if there exists a belief µ consistent with b such that for every information set X assigned to player i and reached with positive probability, and for every distribution over actions in X, s ∈ ∆(A(X)), it is the case that
In other words, if a player reaches a history but only knows what information set she is in, it is not beneficial to change the action of a DAE at that history subject to her uncertainty about where she is.
A DSE is defined similarly to a DAE only we no longer ignore the information sets that are not visited.
Definition 8 (Distributed Sequential Equilibrium (DSE)).
A strategy profile b is a Distributed Sequential Equilibrium if there exists a sequence of completely mixed strategy profiles b 1 , b 2 , ... that converge to b and a sequence of positive real numbers 1 , 2 , ... that converge to 0 such that for every k, for every belief µ consistent with b k , for every information set X (assigned to player i), and for every s ∈ ∆(A(X)), it is the case that
In order to define DPE we must extend DAE to perturbed games. A DAE of a perturbed game (Γ, η) is a perturbed strategy profile that satisfies the definition of a DAE with the addition provision that the deviations considered must also be perturbed. By this we mean that for an information set X, deviations s ∈ ∆(A(X)) must satisfy for all a ∈ A(X), s(a) ≥ η(X)(a).
Definition 9 (Distributed Perfect Equilibrium (DPE)). Given a game Γ, a strategy profile b is a Distributed Perfect Equilibrium if there exists a sequence of perturbed games (Γ, ν 1 ), (Γ, η 2 ), . . . where η k → 0 and a sequence of correspondingly perturbed strategy profiles
DNE is a bit of a contrived notion, and for this reason we present it last. To define DNE we first have to present the notion of equivalent strategy profiles, as defined by Battigalli [3] : Two strategy profiles b and b are equivalent, written b ∼ = b , if they induce the same probability for every history. We extend this definition slightly to apply to strategies, not only strategy profiles. Given a strategy profile b, two strategies b i and b i of player i are equivalent with respect to b,
Definition 10 (Distributed Nash Equilibrium (DNE)). A strategy profile b is an Distributed Nash Equilibrium if it is a DAE and for every player i there exists a strategy b i ∼ = b i , a sequence of completely mixed player i strategies b
. . that converge to b i , and a sequence of positive real numbers 1 , 2 , . . . that converge to 0 such that for all k, for every belief µ consistent with
, for every information set X (assigned to player i) with positive probability in b k , and for every s ∈ ∆(A(X)), it is the case that
Establishing the Hierarchy of Distributed Equilibrium Concepts
We begin by proving the inclusion relationships that are analogous to the inclusion relationships among AE, NE, SE, and PE. Proposition 1. Every DPE is a DSE.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2. Every DSE is a DNE.
Proposition 3. Every DNE is a DAE.
Proof. This is true by definition.
The strictness of these inclusion relations is implied by the collapse of the distributed equilibrium concepts to their standard counterparts (as will be shown in Section 5) and the strictness of the inclusion relations for these standard concepts (as shown, for example, in Figure 6 ).
Proof of Existence
This section will be concerned with proving the following theorem: Theorem 1. All games of imperfect recall have a DPE.
From this theorem, we will immediately get the corollary:
Corollary 2. All games of imperfect recall have a DSE, a DNE, and a DAE.
Before we tackle the existence of DPE directly we must present two new concepts. First, we define the notion of partial symmetry and show the existence of partially symmetric perfect equilibria in partially symmetric games. We then go on to define a generalization of the agent form of a game which we dub the distributed agent form. Finally, we bring these two concepts together to and show that a partially symmetric perfect equilibrium of this distributed agent form corresponds to a DPE of the original game.
Partial Symmetry
A symmetry of a game Γ is a permutation χ over the players of Γ such that the strategy spaces of permuted players remains the same and the utility to each player of permuting all players' roles by χ remains the same. In other words χ is a symmetry of Γ if for every player i and every strategy profile b we have
Note that the second line overloads the permutation χ to permute the strategies of a strategy profile (which produces a well defined strategy profile so long so long as the first line holds).
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Let G be a subgroup of S n (the symmetric group on n symbols). A game Γ with n players is G-symmetric if for every χ ∈ G, χ is a symmetry of the game Γ. Furthermore, a G-symmetric strategy profile of a G-symmetric game Γ is a strategy profile b ∈ Σ such that for all χ ∈ G, χ(b) = b (we will denote the set of G-symmetric strategy profiles of Γ as Σ G ). Lastly, a G-symmetric Nash equilibrium is a G-symmetric strategy profile that is also a Nash equilibrium of Γ.
Thus an n-player symmetric game (in the well known sense) is a S n -symmetric game and a symmetric equilibrium of this game is a S n -symmetric Nash equilibrium. Also note that all games are still symmetric with respect to the trivial subgroup. Partial symmetry, therefore, bridges the gap between fully symmetric games and games with no explicit symmetry.
A natural question to ask is whether a partially symmetric Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in a partially symmetric game. Thankfully, just as with standard Nash and fully symmetric Nash, a partially symmetric Nash equilibrium exist in every game. Formally, this is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Ever G-symmetric game has a G-symmetric Nash equilibrium.
We now turn our attention to partially symmetric perfect equilibria. For our purposes it won't be sufficient to simply show the existence of a perfect equilibrium that is also partially symmetric. Instead we will opt for a notion of perfectness with partial symmetry built in.
To this end we need to define the notion of a partially symmetric perturbation. A perturbation η is consider a G-symmetric perturbation if for all χ ∈ G χ(η) = η. In this definition we again overload χ to permuted perturbations as though they were strategy profiles (that happens to not sum to 1 for every information set). Similarly, a G-symmetric perturbed game is a perturbed game (Γ, η) where η is aG-symmetric perturbation.
Before proving the existence of partially symmetric perfect equilibria we must first show the existence of partially symmetric Nash equilibria in partially symmetric perturbed games.
Proposition 5. Let Γ be a G-symmetric game and η a G-symmetric perturbation of Γ. There exists a G-symmetric Nash equilibrium of (Γ, η).
We now have sufficient vocabulary to define a partially symmetric perfect equilibrium.
Definition 11. Let Γ be a G-symmetric game. b is a G-symmetric perfect equilibrium if there exists a sequence of G-symmetric perturbed games (Γ, η 1 ), (Γ, η 2 ), . . . and a sequence of G-symmetric Nash equilibria b 1 , b 2 , . . . of these perturbed games such that b k → b and η k → 0.
Our final proposition of the section follows easily from this definition and our other previous result.
Proposition 6. Let Γ be a G-symmetric game. There exists a G-symmetric perfect equilibrium of Γ Proof. See Appendix.
The Distributed Agent Form
The standard agent form of a game gives control of every information set to an independent agent. The distributed agent form further breaks down control of information sets. Before we talk about the distributed agent form, however, we must first take an aside and define a few crucial constructions. First, we must stratify an information set into partitions that have no absentmindedness. To do this we define a more general version of the Grove and Halpern upper frontier of an information set [5] .
Let d X (h) denote the depth of h within information set X. Formally, let us recursively define depth within an information set as follows:
Definition 12. For a history h, Let H <h = {h : h < h}. The depth of history h within information set X is given by
Definition 13. Let the nth frontier of an information set X, denotedX n , be defined as follows:
Finally let us define the depth of an information set D(X).
Definition 14. The depth of an information set X is defined as the highest depth value of any history for that information set. In other words,
Now that we have the definition of a frontier, we can give an informal description of the distributed agent form. Just as in the agent form each information set is controlled by an independent agent, in the distributed agent form each frontier is controlled by an independent agent. However, this game allows for strategy profiles not allowed in the original game. To mitigate this we will have Nature randomly choose which frontier within an information set an agent controls without any agent knowing what that choice is. Applying a specific form of partial symmetry to this game then eliminates the excess strategy profiles. This is made significantly clearer in Figure 3 .
Formally, the distributed agent form is defined as follows.
Definition 15 (distributed agent form). The agent form of a game Γ = N, H, P, ρ, u, I is a derivative game Γ where:
There is an agent for every frontier and if (X, j) ∈Ñ then the agent represented by (X, j) is assigned to frontier X j . Additionally, letñ = Ñ .
• Consider the following set of permutations overÑ which will be denoted Ψ. A permutation ψ is in Ψ if (and only if ) for every agent i = (X, j), if ψ(i) = (Y, ) then it must be the case that X = Y . It is easy to see that this set of permutations in fact composes a subgroup of Sñ and that
Original If h ∈ H and h = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) then for all ψ ∈ Ψ,h = (ψ, a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈H.
Additionally we add the empty sequence, φ, toH, in order to makeH a properly defined set of histories. In other words, at the beginning of play a permutation from Ψ is chosen, then play resumes as in H.
• Given a historyh / ∈Z
: Ifh = (ψ, h) and P (h) = c (X, ψ(j)) : Ifh = (ψ, h) and h ∈X j • Given a historyh ∈C and an action a ∈ A(h)
•Ĩ is simply the partition induced by the player function overD. That is to say for all i ∈Ñ ,X i = {h :P (h) = i} andĨ = {X i : i ∈Ñ }.
Thus each agent will assigned a frontier of a particular information set uniformly at random, but will never have knowledge of which frontier she has been assigned. Notice that the distributed agent form does have perfect recall as claimed since each agent only has one information set and it cannot be visited twice in the course of the game. Note further that when the original game does not have absentmindedness Ψ is the trivial subgroup and thus collapses to the standard agent form (with an additional single action move by Nature at the beginning of the game). 7 On the other hand, if there is only one information
Agent 2 Figure 4 : The canonical normal form game of the distributed agent form as seen in Figure 3 . This form of the distributed agent form provides a good demonstration of the symmetry of the distributed agent form.
set (and therefore only one player) then Ψ = S n and as will be shown the distributed agent form is a fully symmetric game. There are two crucial observations to make about the distributed agent form. First, notice that the distributed agent form is Ψ-symmetric. This can easily be seen since agents' roles are determined by the permutation Nature chooses uniformly at random from Ψ and agents receive the same payoff as any agent they could be mapped to by a permutation in Ψ.
Second, note that there is a bijection between Ψ-symmetric strategy profiles and strategy profiles of the original game. This follows immediately from the fact that any strategy profile of the distributed agent form respects Ψ if and only if agents assigned to the same information set are using the same strategy. Thus there is a well defined strategy for each information set which is identical to saying that it defines a strategy profile of the original game.
Remark: We will consistently be using the term "player" to refer to someone playing the original game and "agent" to refer to someone playing the distributed agent form (on behalf of some player). Also because of the natural bijection between strategy profiles of the original game and Ψ-symmetric strategy profiles of the distributed agent form, where appropriate due to context adding or removing a tilde will change the game that strategy refers to (i.e. if b is strategy profile for the original gameb is the corresponding Ψ-symmetric strategy profile for the distributed agent form and visa versa).
Final Proof
The following lemma will help form a bridge between utility of the distributed agent form and the original game. Lemma 1. Let b be a Ψ-symmetric strategy profile for the original game, let µ be a belief consistent with b, let X be an information set with positive probabsentmindedness. However, one advantage of using the subpartition based on frontiers is that the distributed agent form reduces to the agent form in games without absentmindedness as mentioned. ability of being reached under b, and let i = (X, j) be an agent assigned to X. Furthermore, let s and s be distributions over A(X) and let = P (X). Then the following two statements are equivalent:
This bridge lemma can be used to give a characterization of the DPE using the distributed agent form.
Proposition 7.
A strategy profile is a distributed perfect equilibrium if and only if it corresponds to a Ψ-symmetric perfect equilibrium of the distributed agent form.
We now have all the tools needed to prove Theorem 1.
of Theorem 1. By Proposition 6 we know that a Ψ-symmetric perfect equilibrium exists for the distributed agent form and by Proposition 7 this must be a DPE of the original game. Therefore every game has a distributed perfect equilibrium.
Collapse to Standard Notions
We now present our final set of results: the collapse of our four equilibrium notions, DAE, DNE, DSE, and DPE, to their standard versions in games of perfect recall.
Before tackling the collapse of DAE to AE we present a characterization in terms of the distributed agent form as we did for DPE.
Proposition 8.
A strategy profile is a DAE if and only if it corresponds to a Ψ-symmetric Nash equilibrium of the distributed agent form.
The collapse of DAE to AE follows quickly from this proposition. Proposition 9. Let Γ be a game with perfect recall. A strategy profile is a DAE if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the agent form of Γ.
Proposition 10. Let Γ be a game with perfect recall. A strategy profile is a DPE if and only if it is a perfect equilibrium of Γ.
Proposition 11. Let Γ be a game with perfect recall. A strategy profile is a DSE if and only if it is a sequential equilibrium of Γ.
We now turn to the collapse of the last distributed equilibrium concept, DNE.
Proposition 12. Let Γ be a game with perfect recall. A strategy profile is a DNE if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of Γ.
Connection to Previous Work
Now that we have presented our main results, we can explain their connection to previous research. As was said in the introduction, our work builds on this previous work very directly. To properly assign the credit, it is useful to expand the map of solution concepts from Figure 2 into the one in Figure 5 . In this expanded picture we add a third column, for the class of games that may exhibit imperfect recall but not absent-mindedness (that is, a player in an information set may not recall her entire game experience, but will never visit that information set more than once).
We populate this column with a new set of novel equilibrium concepts. These concepts (which we denote with an "SD" moniker for "semi-distributed") are very similar to their distributed ("D") versions. Both reflect an ex-interim perspective; in both we consider each node in turn, perform a payoff calculation with respect to that node given a certain strategy profile, and take an expectation with respect to some belief function. The difference is in the calculation. In the D version, as we discussed, we assume a one-time deviation, assuming all other nodes (histories) obey the given strategy profile. In the SD version, we assume a deviation at that node as well as all nodes downstream from it in the information set.
More formally, given a player i, a strategy b i , an information set X assigned to player i, a history h ∈ X, and a deviation s ∈ ∆(A(X)), we can define a persistent-deviation phantom strategy, denoted b i [h//s], for a player i history h (in information set X ) by
The definition of SD-solution concepts are identical to the D ones, except the notion of single deviation is replaced by that of persistent deviation. Specifically, where D concepts use distributed subjective utility, will use semi-distributed subjective utility which is defined for a player i, a strategy profile b, an information set X, a deviation s ∈ ∆(A(X)), and a belief µ by
As an explicit example of SD-based solution concepts, we define Semi-Distributed Agent Equilibrium.
Definition 16 (Semi-Distributed Agent Equilibrium).
A strategy b is a semidistributed agent equilibrium if there exists a belief µ consistent with b such that for every information set X assigned to player i and reached with positive probability, and for every distribution over actions in X, s ∈ ∆(A(X))
Notice that the only difference between DAE and SDAE is that the DSU i (b; X, s, µ) term has been replaced with SDSU i (b; X, s, µ). For this reason, it is easy to see that in games without absentmindedness our distributed concepts collapse to their semi-distributed counterparts. On the other hand, the absentminded driver game described by Piccione and Rubinstein cleanly distinguishes the distributed concepts from the semi-distributed ones (i.e. all distributed concepts prescribe one strategy, while the semi-distributed concepts yield a different one 8 ).
In Figure 5 , the bold solution concepts and (subset or collapse) relationships between them denote our novel contributions; the rest are either produced by previous research, or easily obtained from it. The following list briefly acknowledges the sources of these previous contributions; we discuss a few of them in more detail below.
• NE defined by Nash [12] .
• AE defined by Kuhn [10] .
• PE defined by Selten [14] .
• SE defined by Kreps and Wilson [9] .
• DAE is a straightforward multiagent generalization of Modified Multiselves Consistency as defined by Piccione and Rubinstein [13] .
• DSE is a straightforward multiagent generalization of Modified Multiselves Sequential Equilibrium as defined by Battigalli [3] .
• NE ⊆ AE shown by Kuhn [10] .
• PE ⊆ NE shown by Selten [14] .
• SDPE collapse to PE shown by Selten [14] .
• PE ⊆ SE shown by Kreps and Wilson [9] .
• SE ⊆ NE shown by Kreps and Wilson [9] .
• DSE ⊆ DAE shown by Battigalli [3] .
• DAE collapse to SDAE shown by Battigalli [3] .
• DSE collapse to SDSE shown by Battigalli [3] .
Notice that in Figure 5 there are a few non-bold arrows that either originate or end in bold solution concepts. For example, we say that Battigalli showed the collapse from DAE to SDAE and from DSE to SDSE. In reality, Battigalli showed in games without absentmindedness that DAE collapses to AE and DSE collapses to SE of the agent form. However, it makes sense to attribute these results to others because it is trivial to show that SDAE is equivalent to AE in games without absentmindedness and SDSE is trivially equivalent to SE of the agent form for all games. Likewise, we say that Selten showed the collapse from SDPE to PE, when he actually showed the equivalence of PE and PE of the agent form in games with perfect recall. Again, our claim is justified by the trivial observation that SDPE is equivalent to PE of the agent form for games without absentmindedness.
As mentioned in the introduction, this work is a natural outgrowth from a series of papers sparked by Piccione and Rubinstein. Piccione and Rubinstein initially defined two equilibrium notions for games 9 of imperfect recall [13] . The first -time consistency -is similar to our notion of SDAE. It does not play a major role in our story, nor in the previous literature; Piccione and Rubinstein themselves, as well as the literature that followed them, found this notion problematic, for a number of reasons. Their second definition, howevermodified multiselves consistency or MMCS -seemed less problematic. MMCS took hold in the ensuing literature; for example, Aumann, Hart, and Perry explicitly advocate the mathematically equivalent notion of action optimality [1] . MMCS is central to our paper, as DAE is its straightforward generalization to the multiagent case.
The previous literature establishes several important properties of MMCS. Piccione and Rubinstein themselves show that all optimal solutions to the extensive decision problem must be MMCS. Still focusing on the single-agent case, Battigalli [3] shows that, when restricted to games without absentmindedness, a MMCS is a Nash equilibrium of the agent form of the game. Among other things Battigalli defines modified multiselves sequential equilibrium (MMSE). Our definition of DSE is a straightforward generalization of MMSE to the multiagent case.
These two papers -by Piccione and Rubinstein, and by Battigalli -are the ones we drew on the most, in additional to the seminal papers by Nash, Kuhn, Selten, and Kreps and Wilson. In addition, we have benefited from the insights in the papers by Gilboa and by Halpern and Pass [4, 6] . Overall, though, in order to synthesize the pictures depicted in Figures 2 and 5 we have needed to not only modify and extend the definitions, but add more of our own (the central ones being DPE and DNE). Most of the specific (inclusion and collapse) relations are novel, and most fundamentally so is the existence result (of DPE, and therefore also of all the weaker notions). As mentioned in the introduction, the fact that existence was not addressed in the previous literature is not surprising, since that literature focused primarily on the single-agent case, in which existence is trivial.
Final Thoughts
We have extended the classical scheme of solution concepts for (finite) extensiveform games with perfect recall to the full class of games, including games with imperfect recall. Specifically, we defined the four notions of Distributed Agent Equilibrium (DAE), Distributed Nash Equilibrium (DNE), Distributed Sequential Equilibrium (DSE) and Distributed Perfect Equilibrium (DPE) as distributed versions of their classical counterparts. We showed that (like the classical notions) the distributed notions form a strict hierarchy, that they exist in every game, and that they collapse to their classical counterparts in the special class of games with imperfect recall.
In developing the scheme we defined novel notions such as the distributed agent form, phantom strategies, and partial symmetry, which may merit interest beyond the specific results they enable in this paper. In general, this work suggests a deeper structure of games which underlies the classical view of them, somewhat akin to the way in which quantum physics underlies classical mechanics.
10 It suggests that an individual decision maker can be broken down into even more basic units than "agents" or "selves" corresponding to information sets; within a given state of knowledge (the information set) the decision maker is made up of multiple -phantom, counterfactual -decision makers, each operating in smaller contexts, as small as a single node.
Our results have made use of certain restricting assumptions. These include the probabilistic assumption of, given a strategy profile, setting the subjective probability (belief) of a node within an information set proportionally to its probability of being visited under the given strategy profile. This assumption, which we inherit from previous models (in particular, Piccione and Rubinstein's), is substantive, and it is interesting to contemplate whether it can be relaxed while retaining some or all of our results. Similarly, we have made a specific use of phantom strategies, namely those corresponding to frontiers of an information set. Our essential results also hold in the context of other subpartitions of information sets, so long as those do not exhibit absentmindedness. It is interesting to see whether these alternate partitions can give rise to interesting theories. . .. Given a perturbation η, an information set X (assigned to player i), and a distribution s ∈ ∆(A(X)), consider the following function
As can easily be seen, this function shifts the distribution s according to η. More importantly if b is a perturbed strategy profile for perturbation η then for all h ∈ X, b[h/π η (X, s)] is a valid perturbed phantom strategy profile. Moreover, π η (X, s) is clearly continuous with respect to η and if η = 0 it maps back to the initial distribution. Because of this and the fact that η k → 0, given > 0 we can choose a K such that for all k ≥ K for all strategy profiles b, for all information sets X (assigned to player i), and for all s ∈ ∆(A(X)).
. . be a sequence of positive real numbers that converge to 0. Let be an arbitrary positive integer. Using the above argument and the definition of distributed subjective utility, we can choose a K such that for all k ≥ K , for all beliefs µ consistent with b k , for all information sets X (assigned to player i), and for all s ∈ ∆(A(X)).
] is a valid perturbed phantom strategy profile for all h ∈ X, we have
combining these two inequalities yields
Without loss of generality, assume that for positive integers < m implies K < K m . This provision ensures that the sequence of completely mixed strategies b K1 , b K2 , . . . converges to b. Thus this sequence, along with 1 , 2 , . . ., satisfies the necessary conditions to prove that b must be a DSE.
of Proposition 2. First, note that a DSE must be a DAE and thus the fact that a DNE is defined to be a DAE plays no part in the remaining proof. This fact follows easily from the definitions and will not be explicitly proven. of Proposition 4. Let us consider the set-valued best response function B : Σ → 2 Σ . It is well known that this function satisfies the requirements of Kakutani's fixed point theorem [11] . It is sufficient to show that for all b ∈ Σ G , B(b) ∩ Σ G is convex and non-empty. Nash already noted that convex combinations of symmetric strategies are also symmetric (all with respect to a particular symmetry χ) [12] . Thus the set of χ-symmetric strategies, Σ χ is convex and because Σ G = χ∈G Σ χ , Σ G is convex as well. Finally, because B(b) is convex for all b ∈ Σ, B(b) ∩ Σ G is convex.
Let b be a best response to some G-symmetric strategy profile b (i.e. b ∈ B(b) ). Notice that for χ ∈ G that χ(b ) is also a best response to b since b is G-symmetric. Now consider the following strategy
Clearly b is a G-symmetric strategy profile and because b is the average of best responses it is a best response. Hence B(b) ∩ Σ G is non-empty.
of Proposition 5. The argument used to prove proposition 4 is valid provided that for any perturbed strategy profile b and any symmetry χ ∈ G, χ(b) must be a valid perturbed strategy profile. Fortunately, this follows immediately from the fact that η is a G-symmetric perturbation and thus
Choose an arbitrary infinitely long sequence of G-symmetric perturbations η 1 , η 2 , . . . that converge to 0. For each perturbation η k choose a G-symmetric Nash equilibrium b k (which exists by Proposition 5). By the compactness of Σ G , there exist a subsequence of the sequence b 1 , b 2 , . . . that converges to a G-symmetric strategy profile. It is clear this strategy profile satisfies the criterion of a G-symmetric perfect equilibrium.
of Proposition 7. Consider the fact that bijective relationship between Ψ-symmetric strategy profiles of the distributed agent form and strategy profiles of the original game also holds for perturbations. That is to say, there is a bijective mapping between Ψ-symmetric perturbations of the distributed agent form and perturbations of the original game. As with strategy profiles, for a perturbation of the original game η, we will denoteη to be the corresponding Ψ-symmetric perturbation of the distributed agent form. Now let b be a perturbed strategy profile of the original game, let X be an information set, and let s = b(X). Notice that if statement 1 of Lemma 1 is true forb, s and arbitrary i = (X, j) and perturbed deviation s , thenb is a Nash equilibrium of the perturbed distributed agent from. Moreover, it is a Ψ-symmetric Nash equilibrium sinceb is a Ψ-symmetric strategy profile. Likewise, notice that if statement 2 of Lemma 1 is true for b, X, s, = P (X) as given and for arbitrary perturbed deviation s , then b is a DAE of the original perturbed game. Hence Lemma 1 implies that b is a DAE of a perturbed game (Γ, η) if and only ifb is a Nash equilibrium of (Γ,η). It follows immediately from this that a strategy profile b is a DPE of a game Γ if and only if it is a Ψ-symmetric perfect equilibrium of the distributed agent form of Γ.
of Proposition 8. Let b, X, i, , s, and s be chosen as in the preamble of Lemma 1.
Note that if we consider information sets X (and an agent i assigned to X) with zero probability of being reached when using b all payoffs are the same. In other words, for all pairs of player i strategies s, s we have
Thus if statement 1 of Lemma 1 is true for all X (and any agent i assigned to X) with positive probability of being reached it is equivalent to stating thatb is a Ψ-symmetric Nash equilibrium of the distributed agent form sinceb is a Ψ-symmetric strategy profile. Furthermore, if statement 2 is true for all X with positive probability of being reached it is equivalent to stating that b is a DAE. Thereforeb is a Ψ-symmetric Nash equilibrium if and only if b is a DAE.
of Proposition 9. Proposition 8 tells us that a strategy profile is a DAE if and only if it is a Ψ-symmetric Nash of the distributed agent form. In games that don't have absentmindedness (which of course include games of perfect recall) Ψ is the trivial subgroup and the distributed agent form collapses to the standard agent form of the game. Thus in games without absentmindedness a strategy profile is a DAE if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the agent form and hence an agent equilibrium.
of Proposition 10. By a similar argument to the one used in Proposition 9, Proposition 7 implies that in games without absentmindedness a strategy profile is a DPE if and only if it is a perfect equilibrium of the agent form. By Theoremof Proposition 11. Before we tackle this proposition head on we must first establish a couple of lemmas. Our first lemma requires a couple new definitions. First, we will define a uniform-deviation strategy much like we defined single-deviation phantom strategies. Namely, a given a player i, a strategy b i , an information set X assigned to player i, and a deviation distribution s ∈ ∆(A(X)), we denoted the single-deviation strategy b i [X/s] and formally define it given an information set X by
Second is a slight variant of subjective utility that explicitly includes this type of deviation. Namely, given a strategy profile b, a belief µ consistent with b, a player i, an information set X, and a deviation s ∈ ∆(A(X)) the subjective utility of this deviation is given by
Lemma 2. Let b be a strategy profile of a game without absentmindedness and µ be a belief consistent with b. Furthermore, let i be a player, X be an inforamtion set, and let s ∈ ∆(A(X)). Then the following statement is true:
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows easily from the fact that for any h ∈ X u i (b[X/s]|h) = u i (b[h/s]|h) in games without absentmindedness.
Lemma 3. Let b be a strategy profile of a game Γ with perfect recall and µ be a belief consistent with b. Let X be an information set (controlled by player i) and J be the set of information sets that come after X that are still controlled be player i (Note that this is well defined because Γ does not have absentmindedness). Given Y such that for all Y ∈ J and for all strategy profiles b
Also given X such that for all a ∈ A(X) where max of the empty set evaluates to 0.
Proof. Assume that information set X has been reached and action a ∈ A(X) taken. Now consider the set of information setsĴ that are reached first after action a is taken (again this is unambiguous since Γ has perfect recall). Y ∈Ĵ will have a probability of p(Y |X Proof. =⇒ Clearly any sequential equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium of the agent game since it expands the set of strategies under consideration at every information set. ⇐= Let > 0 and let b be a sequential equilibrium of the agent form with associated sequences b 1 , b 2 , . . . and 1 , 2 , . . .. Furthermore, let µ be a belief consitent with b. Finally, let m be the most number of decisions made by any one player in the course of play (i.e. the number of information sets passed through). Because k → 0 we can choose a k such that k ≤ /m.
For a particular information set X (assigned to player i), let d be the maximum number of moves left for player i including a decision at X. We can now return to the proof of proposition 11. First notice that if we replace the DSU term with the comparable SU term defined for Lemma 2 in the definition of DSE then the resulting equilibrium concepts is the same as a sequential equilibrium of the agent form. This observation combined with Lemma 2 implies that a DSE must collapse to a sequential equilibrium of the agent form in games without absentmindedness.
12 By Lemma 4 this implies that DSE collapses to SE in games of perfect recall.
of Proposition 12. First note that the fact that a DNE is stipulated to be a DAE will be irrelevant to this proof. This is because DAE collapse to AE in games of perfect recall, as shown in Proposition 9, and all NE are AE in games of perfect recall. Thus if we show that DNE collapse to NE without using the fact that all DNE are stipulated to be DAE (as will be shown), the fact that it is a DAE is redundant for games of perfect recall.
It follows easily from the definition of a DNE that a strategy profile b is a DNE if and only if for every player i there exists a DSE of player i's induced decision problem that is equivalent to player i's strategy in b (where player i's induced decision problem is the game where all other players actions are regarded as fixed acts of Nature). By Proposition 11 this leads to the following characterization of a DNE. A strategy profile b is a DNE if for every player i there exists a SE of player i's induced decision problem, b i , such that b i ∼ =b b i .
Furthermore, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if and only if every player is playing an optimum in her respective decision problem. Thus to prove this proposition, it is sufficient to show that a strategy is an optimum of an extensive decision problem if and only if it is equivalent to a sequential equilibrium.
⇐= An SE involves choosing optimal strategies at all of the initial information sets (that is only Nature can precede them) and thus for games of perfect recall it is clearly an optimal strategy ex-ante. Furthermore, because two equivalent strategies induce the same distribution over histories they must have the same payoff and if one is optimal, the other must be as well. Hence if a strategy is equivalent to a sequential equilibrium it is optimal. =⇒ It follows from Battigalli's work (Propositions 3.5 and 4.3 [3] ) that for every optimal strategy b to a decision problem, there exists a DSE b such that b ∼ = b .
13 Because all DSE collapse to SE in games of perfect recall, it follows that for every optimal strategy there exists an equivalent SE.
